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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XII
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY TO CONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEE
The Louisiana courts have held that an employee of a con-
tractor cannot maintain a tort claim against the contractor's
principal under Section 7 of the act' for an accident that occurred
during the course of work that was a part of the principal's
regular business.2 Although the soundness of this position may
be open to question,3 it has been confirmed too often, perhaps, to
-admit of debate at this late date. When, however, the work being
done by the contractor's employee is not part of the principal's
regular business, so that the latter cannot be held for compensa-
tion as a statutory employer under Section 6, the employee can
proceed in tort against the principal for his negligence. 4 It is
therefore important to determine what contracted work is, and
what is not, a part of the regular business of the principal.
Recently the supreme court held that an employee hired by
a specialty contractor to fish lost tools from an oil well being
developed by the principal was engaged in work that is part of
the principal's regular business in developing the well.5 For
this reason he was not entitled to maintain an action for damages
for injuries that occurred while he was so employed. This posi-
tion is consistent with previous decisions that contractors hired
to haul pipe and material for oil development,6 to pull casings
from wells,7 or to weld oil producing equipment s are all engaged
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. (1950) 23:1101-23:1103.
2. Gaiennie Co. Ltd. v. John 0. Chisolm, 3 La. App. 358 (1926); Dandridge
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 192 So. 887 (La. App. 1939).
3. The purpose of excluding the direct employer from tort liability to his
employee is to accord with the compromise character of the compensation
principle: The employer assumes liability for compensation in every case of
Injury to the employee, and In return he is relieved of responsibility for full
damages even when he was at fault. The principal, however, need never
become liable in compensation to his contractor's employees so long as he
insists that the contractor either establish his solvency or procure insurance.
He Is, In effect, only a surety for the worker's claims against the contractor.
Therefore, he purchases his tort immunity at an inordinately low price.
Nothing in the language of our act compels the. conclusion that the principal
should not be regarded as a third person within the meaning of Section
Seven of the act, and justice does not suggest such a conclusion.
4. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 131 So. 709 (La. App.
1930).
5. Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1951).
6. Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 130 So. 1 (1930).
7. Turner v. Oliphant Oil Corp., 200 So. 513 (La. App. 1940).
8. Dandridge v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 192 So. 887 (La. App. 1939).
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in the regular business of the producer. Hence they are entitled
to compensation from the principal and are correspondingly pre-
cluded from suing him for damages. One court has gone so far
as to observe by way of dictum that an oil producing enterprise
cannot escape its compensation responsibility by showing that
specialty work is customarily done by contractors rather than
by the producers themselvesY
TOTAL AND PARTIAL DISABILITY
In Louisiana the courts have tested the existence of total
disability by determining whether the accident deprived the em-
ployee of his capacity to perform "work of the same or similar
description that he is accustomed to perform." I This formula
has been applied with fair consistency in all cases where the
claimant was a skilled or semiskilled worker. However, counsel
have sometimes objected to this test on the ground that it repre-
sents a strained construction of the act and is entirely too liberal
to the worker."
There is recent evidence that the test of total disability de-
scribed above is beginning to suffer from erosion in at least two
types of situations: First, where the injured plaintiff is retained
in the employment of the defendant the policy to encourage the
retention of injured workers seems to influence the courts in
minimizing the effect of the injury on the working ability of the
claimant.12
Second, and perhaps more important, where the claimant is
an unskilled common laborer it is admittedly difficult to deter-
mine when the accident has deprived him of his ability to do
9. Turner v. Oliphant Oil Corp., 200 So. 513, 514 (La. App. 1940).
10. Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., Inc., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
The test is well stated in Fisher v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 28 So. 2d
59, 61 (La. App. 1946).
The court of appeal has recently announced that under this test it is
quite possible for an employee to encounter several successive permanent
total disabilities on separate occasions. The first accident may deprive him
of his ability to carry on his normal work, while a second accident disables
him from doing even the lighter work that he could still perform after the
first mishap. Stansbury v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Los Angeles, Cal.,
52 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1951).
11. See, for example, the recent interesting address of Richard B. Mont-
gomery of the firm of Montgomery, Fenner and Brown, New Orleans, deliv-
ered before the Mississippi State Bar, June 1, 1951, 22 Miss. L.J. 326. There is*
evidence of occasional dissatisfaction with the test on the part of the courts
of appeal. See, for example, Boling v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 42
So. 2d 567, 568 (La. App. 1949).
12. Boulanger v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 31 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 1947);
Weber v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 45 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1950). Malone,
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice § 277 (1951).
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the same work he was doing at the time of the accident. In the
interest of fair play for the employer the courts have usually
applied the accepted test with considerable liberality toward the
defendant, emphasizing that so long as the claimant can do work
of the "same or similar description" he is not totally disabled.1
Several decisions of the courts of appeal have in effect depart-
ed completely from the usual test in cases involving common
laborers. They have approached the problem by considering the
relative effect of the injury on the claimant's ability to compete
with others in the common labor market.1 4 This latter approach
strikes the writer as being more satisfactory in this type of case
because it takes into consideration the diversified character of the
common labor market and gives the court the necessary elbow
room in administering the controversy."
Resort to the effect of the injury on the worker's standing in
the common labor market offers the further advantage of obvi-
ating confusion which must otherwise attend any attempt to
apply the usual test of total disability as adopted in this state. If
the presently accepted test is used both for skilled workers and
for manual labor, the result may well prove disastrous for skilled
workers who suffer injury. Cases evidencing an understandable
liberality toward the employer in the case of the common laborer
who claims total disability will be urged upon the courts by
counsel for employees where the claimant is a skilled or semi-
skilled worker. This will tend to lead toward confusion and
ultimately to deterioration of our standard test of disability.
The above observations are appropriate for the recent case,
Morgan v. American Bitumuls Company.16 Morgan, a common
laborer, sustained a shoulder injury which produced a minor and
undetermined effect on his ability to do ordinary physical labor.
The supreme court reached the conclusion that he was able to
do work similar in character to that in which he was engaged
at the time of the accident. By employing this test the court was
obliged to emphasize that Morgan would not be totally disabled
merely because he could not perform the duties of the identical
13. Washington v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 211 La. 690, 30 So.
2d 758 (1947); Scott v. Hillyer, Deutsch, Edwards, Inc., 217 La. 596, 46 So. 2d
914 (1950); Wright v. National Surety Corp., 49 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1950), on
rehearing, 52 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 1951). Malone, op. cit. supra note 12, at
§§ 275, 277.
14. Crawford v. Maryland Casualty Co., 39 So. 2d 102, 103 (La. App. 1949);
Young v. Central Surety & Insurance Corp., 41 So. 2d 700, 703 (La. App. 1949).
15. See Malone, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 275.
16. 217 La. 968, 47 So. 2d 739 (1950).
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position he held when he was injured. The same conclusion
could have been more appropriately justified by simply announc-
ing that Morgan's standing in the common labor market was not
substantially impaired.
Since Morgan was not totally disabled, his compensation was
fixed in terms of partial disability, which furnishes an inviting
compromise in cases of this kind. The supreme court was content
to accept the opinion of physicians that Morgan suffered a twenty
per cent disability. This method of estimating the extent of a
partial disability was criticized in the concurring opinion of
Justice McCaleb. 17 He pointed out that payments for partial dis-
ability are based on the difference between earnings before and
after the accident and they do not depend upon the extent of the
disability in mechanical terms. This same position had been
adopted by the supreme court in the earlier case, Sweeney v.
Black River Lumber Company.'8 It is also noteworthy that the
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit has recently seen fit to
follow this view, relying upon Justice McCaleb's opinion, in a
case where the victim was employed for similar work for a third
person following the accident. 9
In the Morgan case the facts indicated that the claimant had
worked as a common laborer for only three weeks before the
accident. Prior to that time he had been engaged in the cleaning
and pressing business, and after the accident he again took up
this work. However, the supreme court stated by way of dictum
that his earnings as a cleaner should not be considered in esti-
mating the extent of his partial disability. The majority opinion
said:
"In cases of total disability it has been held that the employee
is entitled to benefits under the statute even though after the
accident he engages in, or is qualified to engage in, an occupa-
tion dissimilar to that which he was undertaking when in-
jured and more remunerative; and there appears no good
reason why a distinction should be made respecting this point
in awarding compensation as for partial disability. Too, it
would seem inequitable to deny an injured employee dis-
ability benefits merely because he had schooled himself for
another occupation, wholly unlike the one engaged in when
17. 217 La. 968, 976, 47 So. 2d 739, 742.
18. 150 La. 1061, 91 So. 511 (1922).
19. Wright v. National Surety Corp., 49 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1950).
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sustaining the injury, and elects to pursue it following the
accident." 20
DEATH BENEFITS-PRIORITIES BETWEEN CLAIMANTS
Although it has been generally assumed that the existence of
a preferred claimant precludes an award of compensation to a
member of a deferred classification, and both the supreme court 2 '
and the courts of appeal2 2 have formerly so held, this assumption
recently received a sudden jolt by the supreme court in the case,
Patin v. T. L. James & Company.23 Claimant, the infant nephew
of a deceased worker's concubine, who had resided with deceased,
was found by the supreme court to have been wholly dependent
upon him. The worker was also survived by a partially dependent
mother. The supreme court held that the claim of the latter
would not prevent an award to the dependent child. It rested its
decision on the comparatively narrow ground that the existence
of a preferred partial dependent does not exclude the claim of a
wholly dependent member of a deferred group. It based its
reasoning upon the 1926 amendment to the Compensation Act.2 4
More important even than the actual decision was the clear
forewarning that the supreme court is in a mood to throw the
entire conception of preferred and deferred claims out the jurid-
ical window. Further comment on this important decision is
omitted here only for the reason that the case is considered in
detail in a note appearing elsewhere in the REvIEw.
25
BASIS FOR COMPUTING COMPENSATION
Ever since the supreme court decided the case, Rylander v.
T. Smith & Son,26 we have accepted the principle that compensa-
tion payments are based on the victim's full time earning capacity
at the contract rate prevailing when he was injured, rather than
on the weekly amount he was receiving from defendant prior to
20. 217 La. 968, 975, 47 So. 2d 739, 741 (1950).
21. Gros v. Millers' Indemnity Underwriters, 153 La. 257, 95 So. 709 (1923);
Bradley v. Swift and Co., 167 La. 249, 119 So. 37 (1928).
22. Rentz v. Phoenix Utility Co., 141 So. 802 (La. App. 1932); Lunkin v.
Triangle Farms, Inc., 24 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1945); Williams v. Jahncke
Service, Inc., 38 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1949).
23. 218 La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951).
24. La. Act 243 of 1926. It is noteworthy that in all other respects the
1926 amendment has been regarded as the supreme bid of employers and
insurers to make the act more conservative in its operation.
25. 12 LOUISIANA LAW RsvImw 104 (1951).
26. 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933). This interpretation of the act was
unsuccessfully assailed as unconstitutional in Bolden v. Plant Line Stevedor-
ing Co., 169 So. 189 (La. App. 1936).
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the accident. However, a group of cases involving injured relief
workers, decided during the depression,27 laid the groundwork
for the contention that where the contract of employment states
specifically the amount of work to be done weekly, this ig con-
trolling, despite the fact that the victim was employed only part
of the time by the defendant and the work contract did not
exhaust his full earning capacity. Since that time the law has
become very confused on this matter.28
So long as the worker was hired under a contract for a spe-
cific job of only a few day's or hour's duration the courts have
cheerfully based his compensation on the hourly rate multiplied
by forty-eight, the number of hours supposedly contained in a
full work week.29 However, if the claimant was regularly hired
under a running contract for, say, one day's work per week,
there has been a manifest tendency to restrict his compensation
to the weekly amount provided by the contract.30 The most
recent case to reach this conclusion was Jarrell v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company,31 decided by the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit in 1949. It is gratifying to report that this decision has
been reversed by the supreme court during the last term. 2
Although the opinion of the supreme court is very brief, it
reaffirms the broad principle of the Rylander decision. The court
properly discounted the two contrary cases against relief agencies,
referred to above, by pointing out that these cases represent
exceptional situations.
The court also referred to Gay v. Stone & Webster33 and
Abbott v. Swift & Company.8 4 The first of these two cases
restricted the plaintiff to compensation based on the prevailing
27. Durrett v. The Unemployment Committee, 152 So. 138 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1934); Young v. Unemployment Relief Administration, 154 So. 642 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1934). See also Barr v. United Gas Public Service Co., 183 La.
873, 165 So. 129 (1935); Suire v. Union Sulphur Co., 155 So. 517 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1934).
28. The position described above was effectively criticized by the Court of
Appeal for the Second Circuit in Hayes v. Barras, 6 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 1941).
29. King v. American Tank & Equipment Co., 144 So. 283 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1932); Hayes v. Barras, 6 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
30. Stephens v. Catalano, 7 So. 2d 380 (La. App. Orl. 1947). Jarrell v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 41 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
31. 41 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 1949). The writer erroneously attributed this
decision to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, in Malone, op. cit. supra note
12, at 438. He finds that he was in similar error in denying the second circuit
credit for the excellent opinion in Hayes v. Barras, 6 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 1941).
Malone, op. cit. supra note 12, at 436, 438. To that author, a thorough repri-
mand for his carelessness.
32. Jarrell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 218 La. 531, 50 So. 2d 22 (1950).
33. 191 So. 745 (La. App. 1939).
34. 6 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 1942).
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forty hour week (rather than the usual presumed forty-eight
hours); the second case allowed the claimant compensation based
on overtime payments provided in the contract.35 These cases,
the supreme court observed, are not inconsistent with the holding
in the Rylander case. This suggests that our supreme court is
prepared to relinquish the notion that "earning capacity" means
arbitrarily the ability to work forty-eight hours per week. The
spare opinion in the Jarrell case throws a valuable light on the
supreme court's attitude toward a much disputed area of the
compensation law. The decision is certain to invite further liti-
gation in order to clarify remaining uncertainties. The writer's
views on this problem are set forth in detail elsewhere.36
35. The supreme court did not mention its own opinion to the same effect
in Buxton v. W. Horace Williams & Co., 203 La. 261, 13 So. 2d 855 (1943).
36. Malone, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 323.
